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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Borodin: Off the cuff (or what I miss most about the Yel'tsin years)  
Did the former Kremlin Business Manager not get the memo?  In Putin's 
administration, apparatchiki are neither to be seen nor heard.  (Until they are 
presented as possible "successors" and then they are to be torn to shreds.) 
 
Apparently in response to the flurry of negative press ignited by the presidential 
"elections" in Belarus, but ostensibly to commemorate the ten year anniversary of 
the formation of the Union state, Pavel Borodin, State Secretary of the Union 
State of Russia and Belarus, held a press conference to discuss political and 
economic developments and to revive the "smack upside the head" as the 
preferred method of resolving political differences.  
 
Borodin covered a broad array of topics, from the economic imperative of 
"imperial rules:"  "We have also started acting in line with the rules of the game 
aimed at restoring the whole of the post-Soviet space.  The thing is that there is a 
macroeconomic law: 300 million consumers are required, energy resources are 
needed, and foodstuffs are needed.  We have a program for that." (1) 
 
Borodin brags that construction of the Union State—and by extension, a 
reformed central state in the post-Soviet space—provides a natural foundation 
for stable and prosperous governance, especially prosperous.  By providing 
large-scale borderless movement of transportation, fiber optics, energy and other 
resources, a unified state would earn significant sums in transit costs alone.  
According to Borodin, Putin has seen the wisdom of this idea but has been 
stymied by two successive Prime Ministers:  "There is an instruction to former 
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Prime Minister Kasyanov.  A total of three, if I am not mistaken.  Two instructions 
have been issued to Prime Minister Fradkov by President Putin.  But there has 
been no progress."  (2)  This rather serious charge is repeated by Borodin later in 
the interview; is Putin listening? 
 
Borodin's caustic and impetuous style provides useful insight into why he was 
appointed rather than elected to his loftiest posts.  When he notices that Channel 
One is covering his press conference, Borodin asks why, after all "It never shows 
me."  When the moderator responds that it is present for the tenth anniversary, 
Borodin answers (one imagines, muttering), "Unbelievable."  When Ekho Moskvy 
(EM) poses a question, Borodin rifts on an EM reporter who wrote that Borodin 
had been bailed out at state expense for his Mabetex case in Switzerland.  "I 
know your man Sheremet, I already promised to smash his face in when he 
wrote in his lousy book that they paid 3-million bail for me out of the national 
budget.  I didn't take a ruble from the Union budget…."  (3)  Borodin is technically 
correct, the bail was not paid directly to him but to the authorities in Switzerland, 
and it likely came from the Russian, not the Union, budget. 
 
Expanding on his theme that large unified states are more viable economically, 
Borodin managed to swipe a certain former Soviet President:  [U]nfortunately in 
this country, whether in Russia or the USSR, if there is a man at the top who can 
get things done, everything is developing.  As soon as somebody comes along 
with a big birthmark on his forehead, everything goes haywire.  No offense 
meant." (4)  None taken, I'm sure. 
 
On the subject of the (proposed) constitutional structure of the Union State, 
Borodin contrasted the American governing system with one president—one 
main figure of authority—to the Russian system.  Apparently, his thoughts then 
wandered to the drafting of the Russian constitution:  "In this country, everyone 
has all the authority.  Who wrote our Constitution? [Viktor] Sheinis.  He went to 
America, I gave him money and he rewrote the Constitution.  Well, he botched 
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the job." (5)  It is uncertain whether or not Putin holds the Russian Constitution in 
the same esteem as expressed by Borodin, but that could be an important piece 
of information for 2008. 
 
Borodin did drop one other nugget from his days at the Kremlin in Yel'tsin's 
administration.  By way of fleshing out economic remarks concerning the need to 
consider options and "variants" before making a decision,  "When we bought a 
car for the President, we drove 16 cars into a wall.  When we chose suits for 
Skuratov and Yel'tsin, we looked at fifteen suits. And so on."  (6) Perhaps 
"Kremlin Butler" was the right moniker for Borodin back in the day, but even at 
that, why was Borodin buying suits for the Procurator-General? 
 
Perhaps the most interesting thing about this press conference is that Borodin's 
Press Secretary, Mr. Makuskok, stood by his side and said little, while the State 
Secretary of the Union State had his say. 
 
When is a priority only a passing whim? 
President Putin met for the second time with his Council for the Implementation 
of Priority National Projects on 7 April.  It had been more than four months since 
their last meeting.  (7)  In the interim, apparently regional leaders and the 
government had gotten down to some of the tasks they were meant to do 
concerning education, forestry and modernization.  Hard to imagine where 
Putin's "back-burnered" items show up on the agenda. 
 
Bureaucratic records bursting 
Despite Dmitri Kozak's valiant efforts to curb the growth of the Russian state 
administration through reform, it seems the Russian bureaucracy grew by 
143,500 individuals last year to reach nearly 1.5 million. (8)  According to the 
Russian state statistical service (Rosstat), efforts to trim the state apparatus 
bottomed out in 2001, and the number of apparatchiki has grown steadily ever 
since.  After several years of significant growth in the regional organs of 
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government, last year's growth was most notable in the central apparatus.  
Personnel levels in the Legislative organs rose by only 2 percent in 2005, they 
leapt 20.4 percent in the Executive branch.  The Federal Tax Service, 
surprisingly, saw a decline in size by 2.5 percent. (9) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Press Conference with Pavel Borodin, Interfax, 12:00, 3 Apr 06; Federal 
News Service, Inc Official Kremlin Int'l News broadcast via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid  
(7) Opening Remarks at Meeting of the Council for Implementation of Priority 
National Projects, 7 Apr 06 via www.kremlin.ru. 
(8) Vertical of Manpower, Kommersant, 12 Apr 06 via Johnson's Russia List 
(JRL), 13 April 06, 2006-#88. 
(9) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By John Kafer 
 
Siloviki power structures: coordination and reform 
There is little debate that Russia’s prime security threat today is that of terrorism, 
particularly in the North Caucasus.   Russia has spared little in throwing 
resources at the problem, including military units of the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD), internal troops of the Interior Ministry, and secret services assigned to 
the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the General Staff’s Main Intelligence 
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Directorate (GRU).  Yet, instability and violence, previously limited to Chechnya, 
have spread throughout the North Caucasus.  
 
Despite achieving tactical “success,” Russian security forces are realizing 
strategic failure.  GRU’s Vostok military intelligence battalion raid of the Chechen 
village of Borozdinovskaya in June 2005, is a prime example: 70 to 80 GRU 
officers looted and set fire to houses, forcing 1,000 residents to flee to Dagestan; 
one resident was shot to death and 11 others simply “disappeared.” (1)  The 
security services’ response to the Nalchik attack last October was another 
example; innocent civilians were rounded up, reclassified as terrorists, and then 
beaten or killed. (2)  Many in the local populations deplored the terrorist attacks, 
but became vehemently anti-Russia following the atrocious responses of the 
security services. 
 
Without professionalizing their security forces and achieving unity of effort, 
Russia cannot hope to “win” in the North Caucasus.  Aside from the sheer 
brutality of the security forces, their lack of coordination and disunity continues to 
impede success.  Each of the security structures retains separate and 
independent command and control systems with little information sharing. 
 
The GRU forces, which operate separately from other MOD forces, operate 
special forces detachments and retain considerable prestige in Moscow.  Their 
East and West detachments in Chechnya are staffed with ethnic Chechens and 
have been granted the status of Battalions, and their commanders have met with 
Sergei Ivanov, the Defense Minister, who promised them the most sophisticated 
weapons and the MOD’s continued support. (3) 
 
The FSB utilizes Combined Special Teams and secret forces of the Special 
Assignment Center.  The Combined Special Teams are controlled by the 
Regional Operational Headquarters and evidence shows they are involved in 
many of the “disappearances” throughout the region.  It is unknown if the regional 
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headquarters’ geographic boundaries even encompass the same geographic 
boundaries as the military districts with military forces operating in the same 
areas. (4) 
 
In addition to local security forces, the MVD has Provisional Special Tactics 
Teams, from central Russia, that operate throughout the North Caucasus.  These 
teams do not accept orders from the Regional Operational Headquarters, only 
from Moscow, then operate independently once in the field.  Evidence shows 
they also are involved in many of the “disappearances.” (5) 
 
Not only are the special forces organized under varying chains of command with 
some reporting to superiors in Moscow and some regional leaders, none of them 
talk to each other.  Operations to combat terrorism require rapid sharing of new 
intelligence.  However, even though several disparate directorates within the 
FSB, MVD, and GRU collect information on terrorists, exchange of information is 
“practically non-existent.”  While the FSB shares information with other federal 
and regional directorates within the FSB organization, they do not share with 
outside ministries and structures. (6)  Instead of instilling unity of effort, the 
various special forces end up implementing such things as counter-hostage-
taking tactics, where special forces seize the families of suspects, as well as 
other acts of vengeance that provide tactical success but prove counter-
productive to strategic success. (7)  
 
The recently-announced National Anti-Terrorism Committee could provide an 
avenue to increase unity of effort among the various security organizations.  In 
addition to the federal committee, led by FSB Chief Nikolai Patrushev, they are 
supposed to establish regional structures to coordinate actions within the 
regions. (8)  To succeed, the coordination will need to occur at the tactical level 
as well, to include routine sharing of information.  It remains to be seen whether 
the National Anti-Terrorism Committee can be successful at the federal level, 
much less the tactical level.  Meanwhile, critics charge that the creation of the 
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committee was politically motivated, intended to establish a shadow organization 
to replace the ineffective Federal Anti-Terrorist Commission headed by Prime 
Minister Mikhail Fradkov. (9)  While the new commission may achieve its political 
goal, there is little evidence to indicate it will be any more effective in combating 
terrorism.  
 
GRU and Military Reform 
The Chief of the General Staff, Yuri Baluyevsky, announced the “first ever 
reforms in the GRU of the General Staff.” (10)  The reform primarily affects 
reconnaissance structures to obtain “strict centralization of intelligence-gathering 
subunits under the General Staff's auspices” with reforms to be completed by 
June.  General Baluyevsky called this the first step in the reforms, announced in 
December, to abolish military districts and form territorial military structures.  As 
part of this first step, intelligence directorates of the Ground Troops, the Navy, 
and the Air Force will be disbanded and intelligence-gathering sections in the 
Airborne Troops, the Strategic Missile Troops, and the Space Troops will be 
reduced by half. (11) 
 
However, General Baluyevsky’s reforms already are encountering criticism.  The 
same article that announced the reforms criticized the lack of “serious expert 
assessment” and noted the closed nature of the reform process where “only a 
very narrow circle of people know what changes are expected to take place.” (12)  
A Reserve Colonel, Anatoli Tsyganok (candidate of military sciences) is even 
more critical, stating that Russia’s security threats have changed dramatically, 
but that the current Russian Army is not prepared and is “not capable of 
defending the country from contemporary threats.”  He states that the Russian 
Federation “doesn’t need an archaic scheme that has been unchanged since the 
century before last: the Ministry of Defense-the General Staff-military districts-
armies-corps-divisions-regiments.”  Colonel Tsyganok argues that 15 years will 
be required to prepare the Army for reform. (13)  
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So far, reform efforts, such as the GRU reforms announced by General 
Baluyevsky, have been modest and do not include real structural reform.  
Additionally, even modest reform efforts proceed slowly.  The “professionalizing” 
of the military by moving from conscript soldiers to contract soldiers is one such 
example.  Despite Sergei Ivanov’s oft-stated goal to have 50% of the force 
professionalized by 2007 when the length of conscripted service drops from two 
years to one, The Military Balance reports that the MOD’s own assessments 
anticipate only 150,000 of the proposed 1.2 million servicemen under contract by 
2007.  Additionally, due to numerous legal and illegal methods to avoid the draft, 
the military is only able to conscript 10% of eligible men and that 30% of those 
are found unsuitable for military service.  (14)  
 
The years following the collapse of the Soviet Union witnessed a substantial 
reduction in military and security forces, but little organizational reform; huge 
financial burdens on the state and military, combined with scarce (and devalued) 
rubles demanded change.  Today, Russia’s new security threats demand real 
reform, but Russia lacks a forcing function.  The increase in petrol dollars/rubles 
and expanding budgets enable existing security bureaucracies to expand and to 
centralize control.  General Baluyevsky’s GRU “reform” likely has more to do with 
re-centralization of power than real attempts at reform.  Notably, very few GRU 
initiatives ever make the press; recent announcements all have surfaced since 
Putin’s fellow FSB compatriot and Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, took over his 
new Deputy Prime Minister duties in December.   
 
Source Notes:  
 
(1) “Vostok Takes Heat for Raid on Village” by Nabi Abdullayev, Moscow times, 
29 Jul 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) See “Security Services,” The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XI, No. 2, 3 Nov 05. 
(3) “War on Terrorism: Liquidators” by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, 
Novaya gazeta, 19 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.   
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(4) Ibid.  
(5) Ibid.  
(6) “War on Terrorism: Security Structures Do Not Change” by Andrei Soldatov 
and Irina Borogan, Novaya gazeta, 19 Dec 05 via Lexis-Nexis.   
(7) Ibid, “War on Terrorism: Liquidators.”  
(8) “A Hierarchical Security Service,” Kommersant, 17 Feb 06, What the Papers 
Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis.      
(9) “Russia’s New Counterterrorism Body Seen as Sign of Premier’s Fading 
Influence,” Gazeta.ru, 16 Feb 06, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.   
(10) “Reconnaissance Structures Will be Made More Compact” by Alexei 
Nikolsky, Vedomosti, 4 Apr 06, What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.   
(11) “General Staff Will Tackle Deposits. Emergency Reform of the Armed 
Forces Starts with Intelligence,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 Apr 06, OSC Translated 
Text via World News Connection.   
(12) Ibid.  
(13) “Armed Forces Are Unsuitable for 21st Century Warfare,” Nezavisimoye 
voyennoye obozreniye,11 Apr 06 via JRL #87.   
(14) The Military Balance 2005-2006, International Institute for Statistical Studies 
(Routledge, Taylor, and Francis Group, London, UK), Oct 05. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Marisa Payne 
 
Eight is…too many?  
Recently, reports analyzing US-Russian relations increasingly characterize them 
as having “soured.” (1) The Washington Post asserted that in Moscow, “it’s 
beginning to feel like a new Cold War.” (2) The international edition of Newsweek 
asked, “Should Russia be booted out of the West’s exclusive club, the G8?” (3) 
And a Google search of “Russia-US relations” turned up a horde of news articles 
with titles alluding to a “familiar chill” or a “hazy future.” (4) 
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Just four years ago that question never would have been asked; In 2002, 
President Vladimir Putin was welcomed warmly into the exclusive Group of Eight. 
At that time, the G8 countries approached Putin as if he was a democrat looking 
to build a new Russia on Western ideologies. Since then, Putin’s policies, both 
domestic and foreign, have been questioned intensely. The last four years built 
up to a kind of tipping point, which resulted in the release of two very damaging 
reports for US-Russian relations. 
 
The Pentagon’s Iraqi Perspectives Project and the Council of Foreign Relations’ 
Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do have 
caused both US and Russian leaders to question their relationship. 
 
The 210-page Iraqi Perspectives Project, which assesses the run-up to, and the 
beginning of the Iraq War, contains accusations claiming that Russia provided 
Saddam Hussein with intelligence reports about US military plans in Iraq just 
before the start of the war in 2003. The report claims that an April 2006 
memorandum, which was sent from the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
Saddam, contained Russian intelligence reports received from the Russian 
ambassador. Russian intelligence reported US troop movement plans as well as 
proposed US war tactics, including possible sites to be bombed and important 
dates of action. (5)  
 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the accusations were untrue and 
questioned the motivation of the Pentagon for releasing the report in March 2006: 
“The way this was done suggests that there is a political motive here and that this 
could be connected with the situation in Iraq.” (6) The motive, according to 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin, was for the United States 
to divert attention “from the mounting real problems in post-war Iraq.” (7) 
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Following the accusations, Lavrov has become more vocal about his view of the 
US-led war in Iraq, calling the time Iraq is taking to form a new government as 
“regrettably becoming drawn out.” (8) It is important to note, however, that 
Lavrov, and other Kremlin officials are is reluctant to criticize the United States 
specifically, opting instead, to keep official rhetoric vague. 
 
US-based think tank, the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), on the other hand, 
has been anything but vague. In its March 2006 report, which held nothing back 
in its title, Russia’s Wrong Direction, the CFR outlines issues of contention 
between the United States and Russia, including the Russian meeting with 
Hamas, rollbacks of democracy, the alleged “neo-imperialist” foreign policy in the 
CIS, nuclear policy toward Iran and G8 membership. (9) 
 
The last two issues have become increasingly contentious due to recent 
developments. With the news of Iran’s success in enriching uranium, suggestions 
of strategic US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have proliferated. An article by 
Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker cited anonymous US government sources, 
who revealed advanced military planning to rid Iran of nuclear capabilities. (10) 
The intention behind the leak of this information (accurate or not) is unknown but 
clearly could be aimed at influencing either US or world opinion. Regardless, 
Lavrov, who alluded to Hersh’s article during a report on Vesti, thataired on state-
owned RTR television, has made Russia’s position clear: “I am convinced that 
the problem cannot be resolved through the use of force…[force] can only create 
an extremely dangerous explosive hotbed in the Middle East, the regions which 
has [sic] more than enough hotbeds as it is.” (11) 
 
Russia’s Wrong Direction considers how the United States should approach 
Russia regarding cooperation and recommends the following regarding the G8:  
“[T]he democratic members of the G8—the United States and its allies—need to 
reconstitute the old G7, as a guiding and coordinating force within the group. 
Even with Russia’s inclusion in the G8, the G7 has continued to meet to discuss 
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certain financial issues, selected political questions now require a similar format. 
(12)” 
 
In other words, the CFR report suggests that Russia should not be ostracized 
from the West, but it should be limited in its power and influence. The United 
States, according to the CFR report, needs to recognize that full cooperation is 
not an option. Instead, US foreign policy in Russia should pursue “selective 
cooperation,” which entails cooperating with Russia on such strategic issues as 
Iran and countering Russia regarding its policy in the CIS. 
 
In response to the CFR report, two Russian analysts—Nikolas Gvosdev, editor of 
The National Interest, and Dmitri Simes, president of The Nixon Center—
retorted:  
 
“Selective cooperation—the idea that the US can reap the benefits of partnership 
with Russia on Iran while still making efforts to roll back Russian influence in the 
post-Soviet space—is a chimera. America can undertake the latter if it is 
preparation to forego the former. Foreign policy is not a morality play—and free 
lunches are rarely available, especially not from Mr. Putin for perceived 
adversaries. Wishful boasting to the contrary will not make us safer. (13)” 
 
Will recent developments and the input of respected individuals have an effect on 
the current administration’s approach to Russia? Despite the criticism, it seems 
Bush may still believe that he can see into Putin’s soul. After the release of the 
Pentagon report, Bush proclaimed, “I haven’t given up on Russia.” (14) 
 
Source Notes:  
 
(1) See, for example, “Kremlin takes steps to polish Russia’s image abroad, 
Tactic comes amid US criticism as G8 summit nears,” 11 Apr 06, Boston Globe 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(2) “Russians Sense the Heat of Cold War,” 3 Apr 06, Washington Post via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(3) Google News Search for “Russia-US relations,” 17 Apr 06. 
http://news.google.com. 
(4) “Should Russia be booted out of the West’s exclusive club, the G8?” 10-17 
Apr 06, Newsweek International via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) 2006 #79. 
(5) “Iraqi Perspectives Project,” Mar 06, Pentagon, p. 143. 
(6) “Russia Calls US Charge of Helping Iraq Politically-Motivated,” 28 Mar 06, 
Agence France-Press via www.defencetalk.com. 
(7) “Russia denies Pentagon Iraq intelligence allegations,” 30 Mar 06, Reuters 
via news.yahoo.com. 
(8) “Russia Concerned About Worsening Situation in Iraq,” 5 Apr 06, ITAR-TASS; 
BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do,” Mar 
06, Council of Foreign Relations. 
(10) “The Iran Plans” by Seymour Hersh, 17 Apr 06, The New Yorker.  
(11) “Russia’s Lavrov Warns Against Use of Force Against Iran,” 12 Apr 06, RTR 
Russia TV; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do,” 
Mar 06, Council of Foreign Relations, p 39. 
(13) “America cannot have it both ways with Russia,” 6 Apr 06, Financial Times 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) “Should Russia be booted out of the West’s exclusive club, the G8?” 10-17 
Apr 06, Newsweek International via Johnson’s Russia List 2006 #79. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
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Growing numbers of ethnic attacks 
Xenophobia and crimes against foreigners have been on the rise in Russia for 
some time, yet seem to be escalating still further. Recent events in Saint 
Petersburg provide a case in point.  Samba Sala Lanksar, a Senegalese student 
at St. Petersburg Telecommunications University, was murdered on the night of 7 
April as he and some friends walked home from a weekly gathering at the Apollo 
club. He was shot in the head at point blank range by an unidentified assailant. 
His death has set off a wave of protest from the African community, which had 
already mobilized in December in response to the murder of a student from 
Cameroon, Kanhem Leon. Police detained a man on April 11 under suspicion of 
involvement in Lanksar’s murder. As a demonstration of national attention to the 
situation, the Public Chamber has sent a delegate to join in the probe about the 
student’s death. 
 
The incident is the latest in a series of attacks on foreigners and those of non-
Slavic ethnicity in Saint Petersburg. In 2005, the Main Directorate of Internal 
Affairs of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region recorded 1,073 crimes against 
foreigners. (1)  About 2,000 crimes against foreigners were reported in Russia in 
January and February of this year. The number reflects a 33 percent increase for 
the same time last year. (2) 
 
The Senegalese government issued a formal protest over the murder and 
several demonstrations have occurred. On 8 April, approximately 300 African 
young people gathered to protest Lanksar’s death. (3) A few days later, on 11 
April, a group of African students staged an anti-Fascist protest that massed 
about 3,000 people at the Cathedral of the Savior of the Spilt Blood. (4)  The 
rising xenophobia often is linked in the media and in political discourse, with the 
rise of a Russian fascist movement. The Moscow Human Rights Bureau 
estimates that there are currently between 50,000 and 70,000 Neo-Nazis in 
Russia. (5) 
 
 15 
Other serious incidents involving foreigners in Saint Petersburg in the last several 
months include the murder of Kanhem Leon on 24 December 2005 and the 
murder of a citizen of Mali on 4 February, possibly in connection with criminal 
activity. (6)  Less serious episodes include beatings and harassment, such as the 
attack on two Mongolian students in the metro by Zenit soccer fans on April 16. 
(7) 
 
Church to join human rights movement 
The Russian Orthodox Church has announced a plan to establish its own human 
rights organization. (8) The news elicited a fairly favorable response from 
members of the human rights movement, although Lyudmila Aleexeva of 
Moscow Helsinki Group has pointed out some of the ways that the more 
conservative values of the church could clash with the Western liberal values of 
the international human rights movement. "Our human rights movement is part of 
the international movement to defend human rights. We defend all people whose 
rights are violated, not only those of sexual minorities, but also of servicemen, 
women, children, ethnic minorities and even law enforcement personnel if their 
rights are violated," said Aleexeva. (9) 
 
The church elaborated its view of human rights at its 10th World Russian 
People's Convocation in Moscow. The “Declaration on the Rights and Dignity of 
Man,” produced by the convocation, said that there "exist values that are not 
inferior to human rights. They are faith, morality, sanctity, and the Homeland.” It 
also asserted that the “realization of human rights” should not “suppress faith and 
moral values” or result in the “insulting of religious and national feelings.” (10)   
 
Public Chamber activity 
The Public Chamber plans to keep an eye on the implementation of the 
controversial NGO law, according to Yelena Zelinskaya, deputy head of the 
Public Chamber's media commission and vice-president of the Media Union. (11)  
The NGO law is not the only issue the chamber is following. Perhaps in an 
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attempt to assert its relevance, the Public Chamber has issued statements on a 
variety of issues from the legal draft age to rising xenophobia to the media. It also 
is inquiring into some sticky situations: The most intriguing attempt by the 
Chamber to assert public oversight is in the case of the funds that have been 
allocated for reconstruction in Chechnya. (12)  The Chamber has expressed an 
interest in auditing the financial activities regarding Chechnya. Such an 
investigation is scarcely likely to succeed, but the Chamber’s willingness to even 
broach the subject suggests that it might not be quite the pliant body most have 
expected. For now, however, the Chamber is restricting its activities to somewhat 
smaller arenas. The agenda for the recent meeting of the Public Chamber, for 
example, was limited to a few issues—how to address fascism and ethnic 
extremism, and military affairs. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Over 1,000 crimes committed against foreigners in St Petersburg in 2005,” 
RIA-Novosti, 7 Apr 06; FBIS transcribed text via World News Connection (WNC). 
(2) “Police Draw Identikit of Suspect Blamed For Student's Murder,” ITAR-TASS, 
7 Apr 06; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(3) “Senegal Protests Killing of Citizen in Russia; 300 Demonstrate in St 
Petersburg,” AFP (World Service), 8 Apr 06 via WNC.  
(4) “African students lead 3,000 on antifascist march in central St Petersburg,” 
Interfax 11 Apr 06; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(5) “Website Examines Spread of 'Fascist' Extremism, Skinhead Movement in 
Russia,” www.gazeta.ru, 10 Apr 06; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(6) “Citizen of Mali Murdered In St. Petersburg,” ITAR-TASS, 5 Feb 06; FBIS 
transcribed text via WNC. 
(7) “Mongolian Students Beaten Up in St Petersburg,” Interfax, 16 Apr 06; FBIS 
transcribed text via WNC. 
(8) “Rights Groups Hail Orthodox Rights Center, Criticize Some Initiatives,” 
Interfax, 5 Apr 06; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
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(9) Ibid. 
(10) “Russian Media Debate ROC Attack on Liberal Values,” OSC Analysis, 14 
Apr 06; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(11) “Public Chamber to Monitor Enforcement of NGO Law,” Interfax, 17 Apr 06; 
FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(12) “Skepticism on Monitoring of Funds for Chechnya Shown,” Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 4 Apr 06; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Marcel LeBlanc and Jeffrey Butler 
 
INTERNAL 
Ivanov Strikes Back 
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has taken the upper 
hand in the contest to manage Russia’s military industrial complex.  Last month, 
President Putin signed a decree creating a new military industrial commission to 
manage Russia’s burgeoning investment in its defense industries.  The 
revamped commission is expected to wield substantial influence; however, it is 
not expected to be as powerful as the Soviet-era Military Industrial Commission 
which was one of the most powerful state agencies with a commanding influence 
on military, domestic, and foreign policy. (1)  The new commission will be headed 
by Sergei Ivanov and will be responsible for drafting governmental rulings and 
presidential decrees aimed at managing Russia’s $25 billion investment in the 
defense industry. (2)  Colonel-General Vladislav Putilin, formerly a deputy chief 
of the General Staff, also was named the first deputy of the new commission and 
given ministerial rank.  He most likely will handle day-to-day operation 
considering Ivanov’s growing span or responsibility. (3) 
 
Ivanov’s selection to head the commission represents a significant political 
victory and one more nail in the coffin for Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov.  Ivanov 
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expected to have more control over Russia’s defense industry following his move 
to Deputy Prime Minister last year; political infighting with Fradkov however, 
hindered his aspirations as both men sought primacy.  In December, it appeared 
as if Fradkov might have won a reprieve by retaining chairmanship of the prior 
military industrial commission and rebuffing the need for reinvigorating the 
institution. (4)  However, Ivanov’s personal ties to Putin remain strong, and the 
March 2006 decree puts him firmly in charge and greatly reduces Fradkov’s 
powers for oversight of the defense industry.  For example, the decree re-
establishes the new military industrial commission as a standing committee with 
limited oversight from the Prime Minister.  The commission’s decisions must be 
approved by Fradkov, but Fradkov is not part of the commission; Ivanov and his 
team do not have to discuss or to coordinate their deliberations with Fradkov 
before submitting them for approval. (5) 
 
Putilin further elaborated on the expanded and unique role of the new military 
industrial commission:  His new responsibilities are much broader under the new 
organization, and the new commission has greater autonomy than its immediate 
predecessor. (6)  As Putilin explained, “I will not even be a member of the 
government apparatus. I have an absolutely independent post. If it had not been 
for the No. 314 decree on the separation of ministries, services and agencies, 
our commission would have become an executive power body. But in terms of its 
structure, it does not enter these ranks.” (7) 
 
As for Fradkov, he continues to lose ground to both Ivanov and First Deputy 
Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.  Beyond the loss of direct control of the military 
industrial complex, his administrative staff has been reduced from 43 to 10 
personnel. (8)  The handwriting is on the wall. 
 
Ivanov may now have the upper hand for the defense industry, but numerous 
problems abound.  The Russian defense budget has increased 400 percent 
since 1999, yet there is no substantial increase in the quantity of new hardware 
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delivered to the military. (9)  The reality is that changing leadership at the top 
may provide some benefit, but the Russian defense industry has major problems 
that can not be solved without true reform and transparency.  Russia’s inability to 
explain how a four-fold increase in annual funding over the past several years 
has not translated into increased production is an unsettling enigma that does not 
bode well.     
 
Nuclear primacy  
The Foreign Affairs article on nuclear primacy generated a firestorm of 
discussion on the effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.  US professors 
Kier Lieber and Daryl Press authored “The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy,” which 
appears in the March/April 2006 edition of Foreign Affairs and suggests that 
Russia is now vulnerable to a US preemptive strike. (10)   The authors state that 
Russia no longer has a reliable strategic deterrent as, “Russia has 39 percent 
fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer 
SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days.  The true extent of the 
Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts suggest.” 
(11)  Moreover, the authors believe the US is enhancing and modernizing its 
conventional and nuclear strike capability while Russia’s strategic forces are in a 
precipitous decline.  Their conclusion is that “the United States is openly seeking 
primacy in every dimension of modern military technology, both in its 
conventional arsenal and in its nuclear forces.” (12)  The Lieber and Press article 
also has an interesting spin as it suggests that the US missile defense program is 
most valuable in an offensive context to defeat a weak retaliatory strike from a 
devastated enemy. (13) 
 
The Russian response to the article was prompt and focused on discrediting 
technical merits, questioning political motives, and dismissing the likelihood of a 
US attack.  Furthermore, the Russian response illustrates the latent tension in 
the current US-Russian relationship.  President Putin and Defense Minister 
Ivanov both publicly addressed the article and reaffirmed their belief that the 
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Russian nuclear deterrent is effective and will be for the foreseeable future.  
Ivanov further suggested that the article may even be an attempt to discourage 
Russia from cooperating with China: “Someone may dislike the fact that we have 
established good relationships with China. This leads to such publications in an 
attempt to unnerve us, irritate us. We should treat that calmly.” (14)  Yegor 
Gaidar, a former prime minister of the Russian Federation, proclaimed that the 
article was irresponsible, uninformed, and “when addressing such a delicate 
issue, it would be good to understand the responsibilities that go with it.” (15)  
 
Russia is likewise unimpressed by the arguments for the effectiveness of missile 
defense.  Putin, Ivanov, and other Russian leaders have promoted vigorously the 
missile defense evading properties of the new Bulava and Topol-M ICBMs.  
These new missiles are designed to perform unpredictable maneuvers in boost 
and terminal phases of ballistic flight as well as incorporate other penetration aids 
to defeat missile defense systems.  Viktor Yesin, former head of Russia's 
Strategic Missile Troops, called the claims of US nuclear primacy "incorrect and 
clearly pursue covert military-political objectives." (16)  Yesin further stated that 
the “US missile defense system will have limited capabilities for the interception 
of combat warheads until at least 2020 and will not be able to make much impact 
on the efficiency of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.” (17)  
 
Lieber and Press’s claims of US nuclear primacy are somewhat overstated and 
one-sided but nonetheless provocative.  The article fails to give credit for the on-
going Russian modernization and commitment to nuclear deterrence.  Likewise, 
the US is ahead of schedule in reducing its nuclear forces to comply with the 
2002 Moscow Treaty for strategic offensive reduction.  The US also recently 
announced another ten percent reduction in its land-based ICBMs as part of the 
latest Quadrennial Defense Review.  However, the quick and high-level Russian 
response indicates that this is a topic of significant concern for Russia.  
Moreover, the US missile defense system is still unproven, leaving much 
uncertainty as to its military utility in actual combat.  
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While the vast majority of Russian leaders contend that the threat of a pre-
emptive US nuclear strike against Russia is low, there definitely remains an 
element of the Russian population distrustful of US intentions.  In this regard, 
Lieber and Press have highlighted the need for Russia and the US to come to a 
new intellectual consensus on strategic deterrence as the rules of the game 
clearly have changed since the end of the Cold War. 
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EXTERNAL 
Keeping a foot in the door: Russia’s military in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan  
Although Russian military strategy is not formulated solely in response to moves 
of NATO or the west, the presence or the promise of western military influence in 
the countries that border Russia appears to feature prominently in the minds of 
Russian military planners.  Tajikistan and Kazakhstan provide useful examples of 
success and failure as Russia tries to maintain a strong military foothold – to the 
exclusion of the west – in the post-Soviet space. 
 
Tajikistan  
The Russian military continues to play a strong role throughout Central Asia.  
Typical of this Russian involvement was a recent three-day joint Russian-Tajik 
anti-terrorism exercise that culminated in a reportedly impressive military display 
at the Lahur training range near Dushanbe, Tajikistan. 
 
The anti-terrorism exercise kicked-off on 2 April and involved some 800 military 
personnel, comprised of 500 Russian and 300 Tajik troops. (1)  In addition to 
troops, Su-25 attack aircraft, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, and armored vehicles 
all played significant roles in the exercise. (2)  Although the exercise took place 
at the Lahur training range, approximately 35 kilometers south of Dushanbe, it 
drew on Russian military resources from around Tajikistan.  Specifically, the 
exercise used aircraft and helicopters based in northern Tajikistan, at the Ayni 
airfield, and troops and armored vehicles from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, 
based in Dushanbe. 
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April’s exercise was neither unprecedented nor unique.  Indeed, the armed 
forces of Russia and Tajikistan regularly train together—although Russia always 
seems to provide the funds, planning, and equipment necessary to conduct said 
training.  Still, given its support of these initiatives, the Russian military seems to 
care primarily about projecting a visible presence outside of the Russian 
Federation (to the exclusion of NATO) when conducting such exercises. 
 
If maintaining a ready military outside of Russian borders and pushing NATO out 
of Russia’s backyard are indeed two strategic Russian military priorities, then 
Russia seems to be achieving its goals in Tajikistan.  In a 29 March interview, 
Colonel-General Sherali Khairulloyev, Defense Minister of Tajikistan, seemed to 
confirm Russia’s success on the first goal when he stated that “Tajik armed 
forces have been set up thanks to Russia's assistance and contribution [and that] 
military-technical cooperation between [Tajikistan and Russia] is at a very high 
level today." (3)  Moreover, it seems that Russia’s visible military presence is 
helping to achieve a secondary goal of keeping NATO out of Tajikistan.  
Khairulloyev also seemed to confirm Russia’s success at this goal when, in 
remarks about applying NATO military standards in Tajikistan, he stated, “Soviet 
standards are no worse [than NATO’s].” (4)  Whether Khairulloyev’s Soviet slip 
was Freudian or not, the implications seem clear: the Tajik military owes its 
existence to Russia and, therefore, Tajikistan is not going to jeopardize that 
relationship by seeking a partnership with NATO. 
 
Kazakhstan  
Kazakhstan appears to share with Tajikistan a desire to develop its military and 
has a similar dependence on Russia to assist in that development.  However, 
where Tajikistan made public its military alliance with Russia and its rejection of 
NATO, Kazakhstan made public its military alliance with Russia and its courting 
of NATO among others (including Ukraine). 
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Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s recent visit to Russia was notable for 
the agreement reached by Nazarbaev and Russian President Putin to amend 
pre-existing bilateral arrangements on the use of military facilities and ranges in 
Kazakhstan.  Specifically, the amendments apparently establish conditions for 
use of Russia’s 929th state flight testing center, Emba range, Saryshagan testing 
grounds and Russia’s fourth state central range, all of which are located in 
Kazakhstan. (5)  These amendments seem to resolve earlier disagreements 
between the two countries about how Russia would pay for the use of facilities 
and ranges in Kazakhstan.  With the latest agreements between Nazarbaev and 
Putin, it now appears that as partial payment for the use of the aforementioned 
military infrastructure, Russia will help train the Kazakh military—including 
educating Kazakh service members at Russia’s military academies. (6) 
 
Interestingly, even as it seeks Russian military assistance, Kazakhstan also has 
shown an interest in military cooperation with NATO.  Since 1994, Kazakhstan 
has participated in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that includes, 
among other items, the training of Kazakh service members by NATO. (7)  
Moreover, in January, Kazakhstan and NATO signed the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP), promising to further the military cooperation between the two 
entities. (8)  Indeed, in discussing the IPAP between NATO and Kazakhstan, 
Charles Wald, Deputy Commander US European Command, suggested that 
NATO and Kazakhstan might hold joint military exercises in the future. (9) 
 
Furthermore, Kazakhstan has sought not only to be a beneficiary of military 
assistance, but also to be a benefactor.  In April, the deputy head of the 
Ukrainian air force, Lt-Gen Mykola Botov, stated in an interview that his country 
intended to use Kazakh military training grounds in 2006. (10)  Botov said the 
purpose of such an agreement would be for Ukrainian troops to train in the use of 
the Russian-made S-200 and S-300 missile systems. (11) 
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Russian reaction to military cooperation between Ukraine and Kazakhstan likely 
will be favorable or, at least, indifferent.  With the Russian Black Sea Fleet firmly 
in place in Ukraine for the foreseeable future and with Russian-made weapons 
and weapon systems as the source of Ukraine’s interest in Kazakhstan, 
Ukrainian-Kazakh ties should offer Russia no threat to its military presence in the 
post-Soviet space.  By the same token, however, Kazakhstan’s willingness to 
court NATO likely will give Russia pause.  
 
The existence of the west’s military forces in Russia’s backyard - in places like 
Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan, for example - has always been cause for Russian 
alarm.  But Kazakhstan’s unique missile testing facilities and ranges undoubtedly 
will make western military involvement there all the more alarming.  Thus, 
observers of the Russian military should expect Russia to respond to deepening 
NATO-Kazakh ties in much the same fashion that Russia has responded 
elsewhere, albeit quicker.  Namely, Russia will entrench further its already secure 
foothold in Kazakhstan.  Moreover, it seems likely that Russia will look to expand 
its military footprint in Kazakhstan through the use of combined military exercises 
between Russia and Kazakhstan, expanded deployments of Russian troops and 
hardware to the region, or any combination thereof.  Regardless of the means, 
the military end Russia seeks in Kazakhstan undoubtedly is the same as it is 
throughout the post-Soviet space: maintain a strong military presence outside of 
its borders, particularly if it can be done at the expense of western military 
alliances. 
 
Conclusion  
The interests of the west and of Russia will continue to collide around the world.  
Where the US and NATO once exerted a strong military influence in places like 
Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan, Russia has since reasserted itself.  Russia seems 
poised to do the same in Tajikistan, whereas Russian fortunes in Kazakhstan 
seem less certain. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Kate Martin 
 
NORTH CAUCASUS 
It’s not easy being Adygei 
While the center continues to exert as much energy and control as possible over 
republics, it still must cope with the power of the personality – especially when 
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that personality goes against the party line.  Such a situation has been evolving 
recently in the Republic of Adygeya. President Khasret Sovmen threw everyone 
for a loop earlier this month when, in the middle of a parliamentary debate about 
allotting committee seats, he submitted his resignation to the speaker of 
parliament, who first refused to allow Sovmen to speak and then refused to read 
the letter aloud. In response, Sovmen reportedly announced his resignation 
himself.  (1)  Sovmen’s office later denied he had resigned. 
 
This drama comes against the backdrop of a revised political scene.  Despite a 
vocal opposition, it appears as though the much-discussed, and yet still 
unofficial, merger of the Republic of Adygeya and Krasnodar Kray might come to 
pass.  The Slavs, who form almost 70% of the republic’s population, favor the 
idea.  (2)  In the March 12 regional elections, the Kremlin-supported and -
supporting United Russia, to which Sovmen and the parliamentary speaker 
belong, garnered over 30 percent of the votes tallied. (3) Thus, it holds a majority 
in parliament, and likely would be able to usher through legislation making that 
merger a reality.  However, there is strong opposition, among the minority Adygei 
and Cherkess population; a protest brought about 10,000 demonstrators to the 
streets of the capital in April 2005.  (4) 
 
Sovmen and (also popular) Krasnodar Kray Governor Aleksandr Tkachev both 
have stated that the merger no longer is being considered; they have gone on 
record as not supporting the plan.  Sovmen’s recent actions likely constitute an 
attempt to demonstrate that, even within United Russia, citizens, and party 
deputies, might show a bit more disunity than the Kremlin would want or expect.  
If reports of reactions to Sovmen’s “resignation” are true then it would be difficult 
to ignore Sovmen’s popularity:  not only did the parliamentary deputies issue a 
plea for him to stay, according to his press service (5), but what was termed an 
unauthorized rally was being set up for the following day. (6) 
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The Kremlin has not folded its cards, however; it announced that Adygeya and 
Krasnodar Kray are two of the holdout regions whose laws are not yet fully 
aligned with the Russian Federation constitution.  (7)  That might become the 
cudgel to force the rebellious parties into compliance.  The argument already is 
being framed as an issue of the well-being of Russians:  Putin said during a 
recent meeting of the Council of Legislators that non-conformance to federal 
legislation is leading to significant restrictions in the rights and freedoms of 
citizens.  (8)  So a clampdown on recalcitrant citizens can be seen as for their 
own good. 
 
GEORGIA 
When the caissons go rolling along 
An agreement on the withdrawal of Russian bases was (finally) signed last week, 
with a schedule that envisages the beginning of the pullout next month, progress 
by the end of the summer, and complete withdrawal by 2008 – well, maybe not 
complete withdrawal. 
 
Georgian State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Giorgi Baramidze, recently 
denied that the United States was seeking to position military posts in Georgia.  
According to Baramidze, Georgia has no intention of hosting military bases of 
any other country on its soil.  (9)  What a relief it must have been when that 
began to look like more than merely wishful thinking, as an agreement was 
signed on March 31.  (10)  “The closure of the Russian military base in 
Akhalkalaki, the withdrawal of Russian heavy military hardware from Georgian 
territory and the transfer of control over these military facilities are to be 
completed before October 1, 2007, or, in the event of unfavorable weather 
conditions, no later than December 31, 2007,” according to the agreement titled 
“On Terms and Rules of Temporary Functioning of Russian Troops in Georgia, 
Russian Military Bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki.” (11)  
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Georgian First Deputy Defense Minister Mamuka Kudava said a more specific 
schedule was reached in a meeting with Lt-Gen Valeri Yevnevich, deputy 
commander of the Russian Ground Troops.  “Under the timetable a train carrying 
Russian military hardware will depart for Russia every week starting from 15 
May,” he said.  “By 15 August there will be no arms or military hardware left at 
the Akhalkalaki military base.” (12) 
 
While the hardware is scheduled to be removed from Akhalkalaki this year and 
from Batumi in 2007, the bases won’t be closed until 2007 and 2008, 
respectively.  (13)  Most of the materiel is to be moved to the North Caucasus 
Military District, according to the commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground 
Troops, Col-Gen Aleksei Maslov.  Some will be sent to the 102nd Russian base 
in Armenia, he added.  (14) 
 
And yet, through the euphoria, careful readers of the treaty noted something was 
missing:  mention of another base.  Former Georgian Foreign Minister Salome 
Zourabichvili noted a discrepancy between the agreement signed in March 2006 
and the one she signed with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in 2005:  
“The document makes no mention of Gudauta. That is unacceptable from a 
diplomatic point of view. It means either that Gudauta is not on Georgian territory 
– where is it then? – or that we have omitted Gudauta from the list of bases and 
we are not going to ensure that the Russians leave the Gudauta base,” she told 
university students in Tbilisi. (15)  Kudava followed that up during the next day’s 
parliamentary hearings, noting that, according to Georgian data, there are indeed 
about 300 Russian servicemen still at the officially closed base.  (16) 
 
While the Russians are working on the logistics of moving camp, the Georgians 
are setting up a base in Senaki, just east of the breakaway region of Abkhazia, 
according to Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili.  The purpose of the base is 
clear, Okruashvili said – it will be “a decisive factor during our advance 
westwards.” (17) 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Kyrgyzstan Update:  Political “legitimation” of a Mafia kingpin?  
Last month, celebrations were held throughout Kyrgyzstan marking the first 
anniversary of the “Tulip Revolution,” which removed President Askar Akaev 
from power. The celebrations in Bishkek were marked by a military parade, a re-
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enactment of the storming of the White House, and a speech by President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev, promising “better times” in the near future. (1) 
 
Although the “Tulip Revolution” was viewed at the time as “popular,” events in the 
last six months lead to the unpalatable conclusion that the “revolution” was 
deeply flawed, and both President Bakiev and Prime Minister Feliks Kulov are 
linked with competing organized crime groups. 
 
First, on 21 September 2005, Bayaman Erkinbayev, a Parliamentary Deputy and 
Bakiev ally was murdered in Bishkek. Then in October, during the course of 
prison riots, a second Parliamentarian, Tynchbek Akmatbayev also was 
murdered. (2) Akmatbayev’s death was central in revealing the political-criminal 
links described above. 
 
Akmatbayev’s killing sparked a series of protests in Bishkek led by the 
deceased’s brother Rysbek, reputedly one of the country’s most senior crime 
bosses. The demonstrator’s central demand was that Kulov should be dismissed 
due to his “responsibility” for the prison killings. (3) 
 
Not necessarily clear at first, Rysbek’s motives were revealed by reports that his 
clan was involved in a long-running blood feud with Aziz Batukayev, a Chechen 
and rival mafia boss incarcerated at Moldovanovka prison. Kulov allegedly forged 
close ties with the Chechen while serving part of his sentence (imposed by the 
Akaev regime) at the same institution. Given Kulov’s position vis a vis the 
country’s Security Forces, his removal would have represented a considerable 
coup for Akmatbayev.  
 
If there is suspicion about Kulov’s organized crime connections, the same 
concerns must also be applied to the President. A number of accusations and 
incidents seem to indicate that while Kulov may be connected to Batukayev, 
Bakiev is connected to the Akmatbayev clan. 
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In October 2005, a prominent Kyrgyz NGO claimed that only "funding from 
underworld figures" had brought protestors to the streets in the aftermath of the 
elections last spring. (4) This allegation would seem to provide an answer for the 
question of why it took a full five days for protests to emerge in the aftermath of 
the first round ballot. Secondly, President Bakiev’s reaction to the Rysbek 
Akmtabayev-led protest was telling. Instead of ordering Security forces to restore 
order, Bakiev met personally with Rysbek, who after being promised a full 
investigation into his brother’s death, agreed to end the demonstrations. (5) 
Given Akmatbayev’s position as one of Kyrgyzstan’s ‘most wanted’ criminals, 
Bakiev’s behavior was suspicious at the least. 
 
Tynchbek Akmatbayev’s murder meant that a bi-election would have to be held 
in his Balykchy constituency. Late in March, Rysbek declared his intention to run 
for his brother’s former Parliamentary seat. Several days later, on 30 March, the 
Central Election Commission ruled that Akmatbayev could not run, because he 
did not meet the five-year minimum residency requirement. (6) The CEC’s 
decision caused a 1,000 strong protest in Bishkek (7), as well as a more serious 
demonstration in Balykchy, where Akmatbayev supporters blocked a four lane 
highway, causing a 200 vehicle, 3 kilometer traffic jam. (8) 
 
Three days after the CEC’s decision was issued, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court, 
having heard an appeal from Rysbek’s representatives, overturned the decision, 
allowing Akmatbayev to run. Kyrgyz NGO officials responded to the Supreme 
Court’s decision with some criticism, claiming that it represented a move towards 
the legalization of “gangsterism,” (9) and that the judges had been subjected to 
Presidential pressure. According to this analysis, Akmatbayev will act as a 
“wedge” in Parliament-fighting Bakiev’s side against Kulov and the Parliament-in 
the brewing Presidential-Parliamentary battle. (10) Such analysis would seem to 
be supported in part by the fact that the March Bishkek protests only dispersed 
after President Bakiev, with Akmatbayev present, had addressed the crowds 
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directly, asking them to maintain order. (11) Why did Bakiev again negotiate with 
a wanted man? 
 
The Balykchy bi-election took place on 9 April. According to CEC observers, 
Akmatbayev scored a significant victory, obtaining 79.22% of the vote. (12) But 
his victory may not yet be secure.  
 
Speaking after the election result had been announced, CEC Chairman 
Tuygunaly Abdraimov told reporters that the status of Akmatbayev’s candidacy 
was contradicted by two articles of the election code. Article 28 of the code 
prohibits a criminal case being brought against a candidate, while Article 56 
states that a candidate facing criminal charges may have his or her status 
rescinded. (13) At present, Akmatbayev’s role in the 2004 murder of Colonel 
Chynchbek Aliyev, then head of the Interior Ministry’s anti-corruption squad is still 
being investigated, and he may yet face trial. (14) 
 
Akmatbayev’s political career could also be short-lived if allegations aired by 
Abdraimov are proven. Abdraimov claims that on 11 April, a day after his press 
conference, he received a phone call from Akmatbayev, during which the latter 
“threatened to kill and destroy” him. (15) Akmatbayev’s lawyers have, not 
surprisingly, denied this allegation, and have argued that Article 28 of the election 
code is void, since Rysbek is no longer a candidate but an elected official. (16) 
 
Akmatbayev’s intimidation tactics (if indeed he is behind the threats) may not 
have been limited to government officials. On 12 April, Edil Baisalov, leader of 
“For Democracy and Civil Society,” a prominent Kyrgyz NGO, was shot and 
severely wounded in Bishkek. (17) Baisalov’s recent initiative has been a political 
campaign to ban “figures associated with the underworld” from running for office. 
(18) Given the timing, it is safe to assume that the attack was carried out by 
Akmatbayev’s supporters, if not ordered directly by him. 
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Akmatbayev’s political fate must now be decided by Parliament: Both the 
question of the Baisalov attack and the contradictory electoral code articles have 
been referred there by electoral and law-enforcement bodies. (19) 
 
At this point in time, there is no indication of when Akmatbayev’s case will be 
heard and debated by Parliament. It is safe to say that whatever decision is 
reached, it will have grave ramifications—be they positive or negative—for the 
“better times” promised for Kyrgyzstan by President Bakiev during his 
commemoration speech.  It is to be hoped that Parliament will delay its decision 
until the investigations into Aliyev’s murder and Baisalov’s attack have been 
concluded. 
 
Uzbekistan Update: Opposition sentence appealed 
In late October and early November 2005, as part of a concerted anti-opposition 
campaign, Uzbek authorities arrested Sanjar Umarov and Nodira Khidoyatova, 
respectively leader and ‘coordinator’ of the Sunshine Coalition, one of the 
country’s major opposition groups. (20) 
 
In what clearly was an attempt to deflect any possible criticism, Umarov and 
Khidoyatova were charged with and tried for economic, rather than political 
offences. Specifically, the Uzbek prosecutor alleged that they maliciously 
deprived Uzbekistan of vital financial resources. (21) 
 
After trials lasting only a few weeks, Umarov was sentenced to 14 ½ years 
(reduced to 10 years under an amnesty law), while Khidoyatova received a 10 
year sentence. (22) 
 
Immediately following the trial, Umarov’s lawyer announced his intention to 
appeal the sentence. On 13 April, a Tashkent court “accepted” Umarov’s appeal, 
reducing his sentence by almost three years. (23) In no way can the judge’s 
ruling be described as a victory: observers at the court session have claimed that 
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Umarov appeared disoriented, and fear that he is being treated with psychotropic 
drugs. (24) Speaking for his client, Vitali Krasilovsky told reporters that Umarov’s 
appeal will continue, all the way to the Supreme Court, if necessary. (25) But 
even an appeal to the country’s highest judicial body likely will fail, and continuing 
the ‘judicial process’ will do little but provide some measure of publicity for the 
opposition’s plight. Perhaps Krasilovsky believes that negative publicity will affect 
Karimov to the point of allowing Umarov to seek asylum abroad, in the hopes of 
improving his image before next year’s Presidential polls. Given the current, anti-
opposition, anti-western climate, such an outcome seems highly unlikely. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Eurasia Insight, 24 Mar 06 via 
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(5) Ibid.  
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UKRAINE 
Ukraine’s leaders twist and turn: Will they end up back in Kuchma-land?  
How different is Ukraine in 2006 than in 2004? The result of current negotiations 
over the creation of a new government will provide the answer. 
 
Although the government ran the fairest election in Ukrainian history, these 
negotiations, which have included what appears to be intentional intimidation by 
security officials, stand as a potent reminder that many of the recent gains made 
in Ukraine easily can be undone. It will be up to Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yushchenko to ensure that this does not happen; he has a lot of work to do. 
 
In the 26 March parliamentary elections, the Party of Regions, led by 
Yushchenko’s previously discredited presidential opponent Viktor Yanukovich, 
placed first with 32% of the vote.  The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT) placed 
second with over 22% of the vote, with Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine (OU) in third 
at just under 14%.  Armed with this significant plurality, BYUT, OU and the 
Socialists are now in talks to create a reconstituted “orange” parliamentary 
majority coalition. 
 
The possibility that Yulia Tymoshenko could return to the prime minister’s post 
following these talks appears to have inspired what can only be viewed as panic 
in a few well-connected Ukrainian officials.  Even more, it appears to have led to 
a return to at least one of the tactics used widely during the discredited Kuchma 
regime. 
 
Why else would the State Prosecutor’s Office suddenly arrive at the home of The 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc’s Deputy Leader Oleksandr Turchinov to “forcibly bring 
him for questioning?” (1) Why would they suddenly imply that Turchinov, as head 
of the Security Services (SBU) in the Tymoshenko government, was implicit in 
the illegal wiretapping of a journalist and in the unauthorized removal of 
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documents from the SBU?  Why would they decide to pursue a case at the same 
moment that Turchinov is serving as Tymoshenko’s chief negotiator in talks to 
form a new government? Why all of this, when the prosecutor’s office has not 
extensively investigated widespread reports that the Kuchma administration 
regularly tapped the phones of journalists and opposition politicians – including 
Turchinov – and used compromising documents against them? 
 
President Yushchenko’s press secretary didn’t answer that question. But she did 
tell the Mirror-Weekly newspaper that "the president called such acts politically 
incorrect and even provocative." Indeed. (2) 
 
Yet, while there is certainly no suggestion that the president condones this 
behavior, he has made no public comment condemning it. Meanwhile, Turchinov 
now is in a hospital, where he reportedly is being protected by former SBU allies, 
and the prosecutor’s office has announced that when he is released, they may 
attempt to “bring him in” again “as a witness.” 
 
The office is quick to say that they have no intention to arrest Turchinov and will 
first ask him to come for questioning “voluntarily.”  But as a leader of the 
opposition to Kuchma for four years, Turchinov no doubt is well aware that the 
pretext of “discussions” with “witnesses” at one time meant prolonged detention 
or a pattern of judicial pressure designed to wear down the “witnesses” and 
“convince” them to change their points of view. 
 
Yulia Tymoshenko, at a press conference on 18 April, called the charge of illegal 
wire tapping “incomprehensible,” and praised her deputy – and closest advisor – 
for his “honor and conscience.” 
 
She suggested that the warrant to detain Turchinov for questioning was 
supported by Petro Poroshenko, the former head of the National Security and 
Defense Council, one of the leaders of Our Ukraine, and Tymoshenko’s biggest 
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political competitor. She noted that the order was signed by Deputy Prosecutor 
Viktor Shokin – a close associate of Poroshenko, originally hired during 
Kuchma’s administration. On Ukraine’s Channel 5 television following 
Tymoshenko’s remarks, Poroshenko vigorously denied the charge. 
 
Nevertheless, Tymoshenko forcefully claimed that the action “was done to 
destabilize us” and to “undermine a coalition of democratic forces,” pointing to 
the “curious” timing of the attempt to “question” her deputy. (4) In fact, according 
to several reports, Turchinov actually was notified during a negotiating session to 
create a coalition that the security services were searching for him. 
 
The coalition is on razor thin ice. On 13, April the three former Orange Revolution 
allies signed a preliminary protocol to form a government. As a new 
parliamentary-presidential republic, the parliament now will choose the cabinet 
and, with the president's approval, the prime minister. 
 
But just one day later, Our Ukraine reneged on one of the protocol's points, 
refusing to recognize the item that would allow the largest party in the coalition to 
choose the prime minister (Tymoshenko) and would exclude negotiations with 
the Party of Regions. 
 
The incident with Turchinov, when combined with comments from outgoing Prime 
Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov praising Regions, underscores the fact that there is 
localized but significant resistance within Our Ukraine to a reconstituted orange 
coalition. At the same time, a few within the party – in particular Yekhanurov – 
are reaching out to Yanukovich. 
 
Despite the fact that Regions voted against just about every economic measure 
introduced by both the Tymoshenko and Yekhanurov governments (including the 
vast majority of WTO reforms), the prime minister is upbeat about working with 
 40 
the party. “Our position on the economy coincides with that of the Party of 
Regions  by 75%,” he told Interfax. (4) 
 
A possible reason for this new fondness for a party previously accused of vote 
rigging and separatism, and the rejection of Tymoshenko, may be found when 
one remembers that, as head of the SBU, Oleksandr Turchinov investigated the 
gas trading firm RosUkrEnergo. He attempted to secure arrest warrants, 
reportedly for money laundering and embezzlement, against at least two 
Ukrainian officials who had been involved with the company, but those warrants 
were never approved or carried out by the prosecutor’s office. Eventually, 
according to Turchinov, he was told to stop his investigation by Yushchenko. (It 
should be noted that the current head of the Security Services claims no arrest 
warrants were ever requested.) 
 
RosUrkEnergo has just increased its share in the Ukrainian market, thanks to the 
disputed January 2006 gas deal approved and promoted by Yekhanurov, and the 
firm’s ownership, profits and fee structure remain unknown. Russia’s Gazprom, 
which owns 50% of the company, says Ukrainian officials own and receive 
significant profits from the entity. 
 
When asked who owns and profits from RosUkrEnergo, President Yushchenko 
replied, “I don’t know. They may be Ukrainians, but I really don’t know who these 
people are.” (5) 
 
The company’s non-transparency has caused concern in Western energy circles. 
Charles Tannock, a British Conservative member of the European Parliament, in 
particular has been very critical of the “opaque” way in which the gas deal was 
reached and the use of the RosUkrEnergo company as a “middleman,” saying it 
leaves itself open to suggestions of “a possibility of political corruption here as a 
result.” (6) 
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Even more important, Tymoshenko has vowed to undo the gas agreement and 
complete the investigation into RosUkrEnergo’s activities. She has called the 
deal bad for Ukraine, but good for a few officials. Turchinov would be her primary 
weapon against RosUkrEnergo, thanks to his knowledge and connections. 
 
Our Ukraine has denied any knowledge of the warrant to detain Turchinov for 
questioning and there is no doubt that the majority of members would never 
support such seemingly Kuchma-like tactics. Some suggest that it is nothing but 
a “last gasp” by Kuchma loyalists. But even if this is true – and that remains to be 
seen – it is troubling nonetheless. 
 
Our Ukraine this week reiterated its support for a coalition with Tymoshenko and 
the Socialist Party, but still did not support the point in the preliminary agreement 
that would exclude negotiations with the Party of Regions and allow the largest 
party in the coalition to name the prime minister. (7) 
 
The Socialists responded by calling on Our Ukraine to support Tymoshenko’s bid 
for prime minister, as leader of the largest party in the coalition by far, and to 
remove this “stumbling block” and “open the way for substantial negotiations on 
the forming of a coalition.” (8) 
 
The question remains, however, whether a few of those with power inside Our 
Ukraine – those who may have the most to lose because of a Prime Minister 
Tymoshenko – want this stumbling block removed.  And whether President 
Yushchenko will ensure that it is done. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Wine, whine and Mother Russia in Moldova 
Moldova may be one of the smallest former Soviet republics, but it sure does get 
a lot of attention from Russia’s leadership.  In fact, in recent months, the Kremlin 
has spent a great deal of time on the problem of Moldova—or more specifically, 
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what to do about this little country’s continuing insistence that Russian troops 
leave its soil, that Russia stop supporting separatists there, and that it be given 
the freedom to conduct independent foreign and domestic policies. 
 
Russia’s solution recently has involved increased support for the independence 
of Moldova’s separatist region, accusations against Moldova’s ally, Ukraine, of 
attempts to start a famine in the region, and a boycott of Moldova’s chief export, 
wine. 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s first step was to support the independence 
aspirations of all separatist enclaves on former Soviet soil.  In January, he 
suggested that he would support full independence for Kosovo if the international 
community also supports full independence for these enclaves. “If someone 
considers that Kosovo can be given full state independence,” he said, “then why 
must we refuse this to the Abkhazians or the South Ossetians?” (9) Implicit in this 
statement, of course, were all separatist regions, including Moldova’s 
Transnistria. 
 
Transnistria’s self-styled leader Igor Smirnov, who reportedly met with Putin in 
January, has followed on the Russian president’s statements by increasing his 
calls for the international community to recognize his region’s independence.  
Moreover, Transnistria’s “parliament” recently voted – again – to request entry 
into the so-called Russia-Belarus Union State and to hold a referendum on 
independence.  “Over the years of its existence,” said the nominal speaker of the 
region's parliament, Yevgeny Shevchuk, “the Dniester region has proved its 
independence and self-sufficiency.” (10) 
 
Well, not really.  Throughout the years of its existence, Transnistria has received 
virtually free energy, subsidized products, and occasionally direct monetary aid 
from Russia.  Additionally, the region’s existence always has depended on 
revenues from the vast smuggling network that has developed in the country – 
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filling “state” coffers with undocumented cash from undocumented goods.  These 
“goods,” according to Council of Europe investigators and human rights groups 
like Human Rights Watch, have included weapons illegally manufactured at 
plants on the territory and women being trafficked between Eastern and Western 
Europe.  
 
On 3 March, Transnistria’s dependence on smuggling was exposed dramatically 
when Ukraine implemented new EU-approved customs standards on its border 
with Moldova.   As a result of new procedures – and a new commitment to follow 
these procedures –  all goods entering Ukraine from Transnistria must carry a 
Moldovan customs stamp.  Previously, Ukraine had recognized Transnistria’s 
stamp.  
 
Following the change, Dmytro Tkach, Ukraine's special envoy to the Transnistria 
settlement talks, told Inter television that 354 companies from the Transnistria 
region were registered with Moldovan custom’s officials. He said these 
companies had the right to export products.  All others would be turned back, 
unless they also registered.  (11) 
 
Smirnov and Russia’s leadership immediately began public protests and 
criticism.  Crowds of people bussed to border points blockaded Ukraine’s trucks 
and railway cars heading into Transnistria.  Traffic was stopped for over two 
weeks at some checkpoints.  
 
As traffic lined up, filled with food and products that should have gone to 
Transnistria’s shops, Smirnov incredibly appealed to the international community 
for “humanitarian aid” to stem possible starvation, as well as death from not 
receiving needed medications.  Ukraine, he said, was blockading Transnistria.   
Most of the international community ignored him. 
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But Smirnov also sent a special letter to Putin to ask for immediate aid. "Tiraspol 
relies on Moscow's help and support," he wrote. (12) 
 
Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov was the first to respond—loudly.  “The cargoes, 
including medicines and foodstuffs, currently in short supply due to the blockade, 
are a vital necessity for the people of the Dniester Region,” he announced.  “We 
shall go ahead with our support for the region with humanitarian aid.''  
(13) 
 
Russia’s state-owned Centre TV brought the news of the “humanitarian 
emergency” in Transnistria.  “Day by day supplies of food, fuel and medicine are 
running low in the Dniester region. ... Firstly, it will affect diabetes and cancer 
patients,” television “journalist” Maksim Sazonov explained.  Further, “It's been a 
week since newborns in the republic's Centre of Mother and Child have  
been given TB injections. This has happened for the first time in 20 years. . . . 
Relatives of cancer patients buy expensive medicine in Ukraine and Moldova. 
Not all have the  necessary medicine. Pensioners are the first to be affected.” 
 
And then, to complete the picture, a man said to be a disabled veteran in 
Transnistria, obviously in distress, says, “There is no medicine. I took part in 
liberating Ukraine but Ukraine has rejected us.”  A cancer patient adds, “Of 
course we rely on Russia very much. We have nobody else to help us. Let it not 
abandon us.” (14) 
 
Ukraine and the EU reacted with dismay.  The food and products were lined up in 
trucks by the dozens – clearly shown on European and Ukrainian television – 
blocked by protestors from entering the region.  While Transnistria could not 
export goods to Ukraine without Moldova’s stamp, Ukraine continued to try to 
send goods into Transnistria.   
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This did not seem to matter to Russia’s permanent representative to the OSCE, 
Aleksei Borodavkin.  Without the slightest bit of irony, Borodavkin told a meeting 
of the organization's Permanent Council that Ukraine’s new customs laws were 
“an unacceptable attempt to put pressure on one of the parties to the dispute, 
namely the Dniester region, using economic levers.”  Further, “Vulnerable 
sections of the region's population - the poor, the elderly, the disabled and 
children - are worst affected.” (15) 
 
Clearly, Transnistria and Russia hoped that claiming Ukraine’s new customs 
regulations caused a humanitarian crisis would force Ukraine to back down.  
They were wrong.  Ukraine maintained its position, backed strongly by an EU 
concerned about stopping smuggling.  Slightly over two weeks after the new 
regulations came into effect, a humanitarian crisis truly was about to develop, 
and the borders were reopened to allow Ukrainian food and medicine into the 
region.  
 
Within days, on 27 March, in what can only be seen as retaliation, Russia 
announced an embargo on all Moldovan and Georgian wines (but has reportedly 
excepted those produced in Transnistria).   Gennady Onishchenko, chief of 
Russia's Federal Consumer Protection Service, suggested that laboratory tests 
had found traces of the pesticide DDT and heavy metals in samples of wine from 
the countries. (16)  He said the ban would be lifted after Russia determined the 
wines were safe.  He refused, however, to make the results public of any tests 
done on the wines.  
 
The Director General of the Moldova-Vin agency, Valeriu Mironescu, disputed 
Onishchenko’s claim.  "The Moscow central laboratory Rostest has confirmed 
that Moldovan wines meet all sanitary requirements,” he said.  “Forty-three wine 
samples taken from bottles which have been removed from Russian shelves 
have received certificates of the Russian laboratory.”  But, Mironescu said he 
was unable to discuss this with Onishchenko since neither he nor his deputy 
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would meet with him when Mironescu visited Moscow to try to discuss on the 
issue. (17) 
 
According to Moldova Finance Minister Mihai Pop, wine exports generally make 
up 30% of the country’s GDP, and 80% of its exports were to Russia.   (18)  That 
income is now gone for the foreseeable future.  
 
Transnistria likely will not feel the effects of the loss of almost one third of 
Moldova’s GDP.  On 12 April, the Russian government announced a monetary 
aid package of $50 million to Transnistria to overcome the effects of Ukraine’s 
“blockade.”  (19)  
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